# Logic Extraction for Explainable AI

Susmit Jha

#### Computer Science Laboratory SRI

July, 2019


# Al reaches human-level accuracy on benchmark datasets

Team	Year	Place	Error (top-5)	Uses external data
SuperVision	2012	1st	16.4%	no
SuperVision	2012	1st	15.3%	Imagenet 22k
Clarifai	2013	1st	11.7%	no
Clarifai	2013	1st	11.2%	Imagenet 22k
MSRA	2014	3rd	7.35%	no
VGG	2014	2nd	7.32%	no
GoogLeNet	2014	1st	6.67%	no


#### Going deeper with convolutions. (Inception) C Szegedy et al, 2014







Calista\_Flockhart\_0002.jpg Detection & Localization



Face Detection. Taigman et al, 2014





Speech Recognition

Word Error Rate

## Beyond aggregate numbers

#### Machine learning very susceptible

to adversarial attacks.

#### Szegedy et al, 2013, 2014









Airplane (Dog) Automobile (Dog)

Automobile (Airplane)

Cat (Dog)









Dog (Ship)

Dog (Horse)

the value of 1 pixel. 70.97% of the natural images can be perturbed to at least one target class by modifying just one pixel with 97.47% confidence on average.

Only allowed to modify

Deer (Dog)

Horse (Cat)





Ship (Truck)

Frog (Dog)

Horse (Automobile)

Frog (Truck)

Ship (Truck)



# Beyond aggregate numbers

#### Machine learning very susceptible

to adversarial attacks.

#### Szegedy et al, 2013, 2014







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Automobile (Dog)

Ship (Truck)

Automobile (Airplane)





Bird (Airplane) Dog (Cat)



Ship (Truck)

Only allowed to modify the value of 1 pixel. 70.97% of the natural images can be perturbed to at least one target class by modifying just one pixel with 97.47% confidence on average.



Horse (Cat)

Airplane (Dog)




Frog (Dog)


Frog (Truck)

Horse (Automobile)



Dog (Horse)





#### Low robustness to benign noise Dodge et al. 2017

# **Beyond aggregate numbers**

#### Machine learning very susceptible


e

to adversarial attacks.

Szegedy et al, 2013, 2014







Actual

Basenji

Dalmatia

Border

Collie

Staffordshire

Bullterrie





Automobile (Dog)

Airplane (Dog)

Automobile Cat (Dog) (Airplane)



Frog (Truck)





Dog (Ship)

Ship (Truck)

90  $\operatorname{pred}_{\operatorname{human}}(\widetilde{x}) \operatorname{pred}_{\operatorname{VGG16}}(\widetilde{x})$ 80 % 70 Yorkshire Terrier 60 Accuracy 50 Basenji 40 30 German 20 Shepherd 10 0 Border 50 100 150 Collie 0

Horse (Cat)



Statistically good doesn't mean logically/conceptually good.

Only allowed to modify the value of 1 pixel. 70.97% of the natural images can be perturbed to at least one target class by modifying just one pixel with 97.47% confidence on average.

Basketball (73%)



Low robustness to benign noise Dodge et al. 2017

Dalmatia

Border

Collie

affordshire

ullterrie

Understanding deep learning requires rethinking generalization. C. Zhang, S. Bengio, M. Hardt, B. Recht, O. Vinyals





Ship (Truck)



200

Horse (Automobile)



Dog (Horse)

#### Trust


- Global Assume/Guarantee Contracts on DNNs
- Closed-loop verification of NN controllers
- Extracting and Integrating Temporal Logic into Learned Control

#### Resilience


• Adversarial Robustness

#### Interpretability


- Explaining Decisions as Sparse Boolean
  Formula Learning
- Inverse Reinforcement Learning of Temporal Specifications





Specifications





Specifications
















# Need for explanation



Interpretable but less scalable: Decision Trees, Linear Regression




Scalable but less interpretable : Neural Networks, Support Vector Machines



Why did we take the San Mateo bridge instead of the Bay Bridge ?


## Local Explanations of Complex Models

Not reverse engineering an ML model but finding explanation locally for one decision.




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
#### Formulation in AI:

- Ribeiro, Marco Tulio, Sameer Singh, and Carlos Guestrin. "Why Should I Trust You?: Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier." International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. ACM, 2016.
- Hayes, Bradley, and Julie A. Shah. "Improving Robot Controller Transparency Through Autonomous Policy Explanation." International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction. ACM, 2017.




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# Model Agnostic Explanation through Boolean Learning



Why does the path not go through Green?




Let each point in k-dimensions (for some k) correspond to a map. Maps in which optimum path goes via green


Maps in which optimum path does not go via green

Find a Boolean formula  $\phi$ such that

 $\phi \Leftrightarrow Path \ contain \ z$  $\phi \Rightarrow Path \ contain \ z$ 

#### **Explanations as Learning Boolean Formula**





 $\phi_{explain}$ : Using explanation vocabulary Ex: Obstacle presence

 $\phi_{explain} \Rightarrow \phi_{query}$  $\phi_{explain} \Leftrightarrow \phi_{query}$ 

Some property of the output Ex: Some cells not selected

## How difficult is it? Boolean formula learning

 $\begin{aligned} \phi_{explain} &\Rightarrow \phi_{query} \\ \phi_{explain} &\Leftrightarrow \phi_{query} \end{aligned}$ 

50x50 grid has  $2^{2^{50X50}}$  possible explanations even if vocabulary only considers presence/absence of obstacles.

Scalability: Usually the feature space or vocabulary is large. For a map, its order of features in the map. For an image, it is order of the image's resolution.

Guarantee: Is the sampled space of maps enough to generate the explanation with some quantifiable probabilistic guarantee?

### How difficult is it? Boolean formula learning

 $\phi_{explain} \Rightarrow \phi_{query}$  $\phi_{explain} \Leftrightarrow \phi_{query}$ 

On PAC learning algorithms for rich Boolean function classes

Rocco A. Servedio<sup>\*</sup>

Department of Computer Science Columbia University New York, NY U.S.A. rocco@cs.columbia.edu 50x50 grid has  $2^{2^{50X50}}$  possible explanations even if vocabulary only considers presence/absence of obstacles.


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
**Theoretical Result:** 

Learning Boolean formula even approximately is hard. 3-DNF is not learnable in Probably Approximately Correct framework unless RP = NP.

#### Two Key Ideas



 $\phi_{explain}$ : Using explanation vocabulary Ex: Obstacle presence





Some property of the output Ex: Some cells not selected

- 1. Vocabulary is large.
- 2. How many samples (and what distribution) to consider for learning explanation ?
- 3. Learning Boolean formula with PAC guarantees is hard.




Active learning Boolean formula  $\phi_{explain}$  and not learning from fixed sample.

Explanations are often short and involve only few variables !

#### Two Key Ideas








Active learning Boolean formula  $\phi_{explain}$  and not learning from fixed sample.

Explanations are often short and involve only few variables !






Active learning Boolean formula  $\phi_{explain}$  and not learning from fixed sample.


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
#### Actively Learning Boolean Formula





Find U such that  $\phi_{explain}(V) \equiv \phi_{explain}(U)$  where  $|U| \ll |V|$ 


 $\phi_{explain}$  is sparse

























For each assignment to relevant variables



Random Sample Till Oracle differs



Binary Search Over Hamming Distance

 $2^{|U|}$ 

 $ln(1/(1-\kappa))$ 

ln(|V|)

## Relevant variables of $\phi_{explain}$ found with confidence $\kappa$ in $2^{|U|} ln(|V|/(1-\kappa))$

#### Find U such that $\phi_{explain}(V) \equiv \phi_{explain}(U)$ where $|U| \ll |V|$

### Used distinguishing example based approach from ICSE'10


Susmit Jha, Sumit Gulwani, Sanjit A Seshia, and Ashish Tiwari. Oracle-guided component-based program synthesis. In 2010 ACM/IEEE 32nd International Conference on Software Engineering, volume 1, pages 215–224. IEEE, 2010.


Scales to ~200 variables


Build Truth Table for the relevant variables U Worst Case:  $2^{|U|}$ 

 $\phi_{explain}$  found with confidence  $\kappa$  in  $O(2^{|U|} ln(|V|/(1-\kappa)))$ 

A PAC Learning Framework









Reactive ExplorationStrategy $10^{28}$ |V| = 96|U| <= 2|U| <= 2Runtime < 5 seconds</td>


Image Classification: MNIST



Image Classification: ImageNet with Carlini-Wagner Adversarial Attacks









### Why not just do sensitivity analysis?





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




### Why not just do sensitivity analysis?









#### Sensitivity (IG)

Sparse Boolean Formula Learning

### Learning Temporal Logic Properties from Noisy Time Traces





**Demonstrations** 

)  $\propto e^{D_{KL}\left(\mathcal{B}(\overline{\varphi}) \parallel \mathcal{B}(\widehat{\varphi})\right)}$ 

Bernoulli

Distribution

Satisfaction probability for Alice given dynamics Satisfaction probability given uniformly random actions

- Composable
- Resilient to changes in task context
- Interpretable
- Can leverage formal methods tools

Marcell Vazquez-Chanlatte, Susmit Jha , Ashish Tiwari, Mark K. Ho and Sanjit A. Seshia. Learning Task Specifications from Demonstrations. NeurIPS, 2018

### Communicating Using Demonstrations: More involved example

- 1. Avoid fire (red).
- 2. Eventually Recharge (yellow).
- 3. If you touch the water (blue) then dry off (brown) before recharging (yellow).

**Temporal Logic Specification** 

- H: Historically
- O: Once
- S: Since

Start

 $(H\neg red \land O \ yellow) \land H((yellow \land O \ blue) \Rightarrow (\neg blue \ S \ brown)).$ 


# Interpretability / Explanation Generation in TRINITY

- Inferring and Conveying Intentionality: Beyond Numerical Rewards to Logical Intentions. Susmit Jha and John Rushby.
   AAAI Spring Symposium, Towards Conscious AI Systems, 2019
- Learning Task Specifications from Demonstrations. Marcell Vazquez-Chanlatte, Susmit Jha, Ashish Tiwari, Mark K. Ho and Sanjit A. Seshia. Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2018
- Explaining AI Decisions Using Efficient Methods for Learning Sparse Boolean Formulae. Susmit Jha, Tuhin Sahai, Vasumathi Raman, Alessandro Pinto and Michael Francis. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 2018
- On Learning Sparse Boolean Formulae For Explaining Al Decisions. Susmit Jha, Vasumathi Raman, Alessandro Pinto, Tuhin Sahai, and Michael Francis. NASA Formal Methods (NFM), 2017

### Thanks!

If you are interested in building *trusted, resilient and interpretable* AI, please contact me with your CV if you are interested.

#### TRINITY @ SRI



#### **Co-travelers (Present and Past):**

Brian Burns, Margaret Chapman, Ajay Divakaran, Sauradeep Dutta, Michael Francis, Mark K. Ho, Uyeong Jang, Brian Jalaian, Somesh Jha, Patrick Lincoln, Alessandro Pinto, Vasu Raman, John Rushby, Dorsa Sadigh, Sriram Sankaranarayanan, Sanjit A. Seshia, Natarajan Shankar, Ashish Tiwari, Claire Tomlin, Marcell Vazquez-Chanlatte, Gunjan Verma

#### Funding sources (Present and Past):

DARPA, US Army Research Laboratory, National Science Foundation

### TRINITY @ SRI

